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CORRUPTION CONTROL AND MONSTERING 
GOVERNMENT AGENDAS, COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS 




Institute of Criminology 
In 1818, the Governor of the Chinese province of Shansi reported the case of Chan Lin 
who, while gatekeeper for the district magistrate, maintained "external criminal 
connections". Using his position he endeavoured to get a money changer to accept for 
exchange more than 300 ounces of sub-standard silver. Upon being rebuffed he took steps 
to have the moneychanger locked up. 
The Board of Punishments (which was a senior court of appeal in China during 
that period) held that because the act differed in no way from extortion as practised by 
rapacious government underlings, it would be improper to show leniency to the accused 
simply because he did not succeed in gaining an unfair pecuniary advantage. In this regard 
personal servants of an official would be punished on the same scale as minor government 
functionaries. 2 
This example of what might be termed public corruption raises several interesting 
issues which will be developed in this paper. Initially there is the composition of 
corruption, centred as it is on financial advantage, and a property rights perspective. The 
broad criminal offence based categories which determine the illegality of such behaviour 
include bribery, extortion, intimidation, pecuniary malfeasance, and malpractice. 
An essential factor in the criminalisation of corruption is the application of 
sanctions. Of particular significance in this process are the relationships of special 
privilege, and fiduciary responsibility. And in any consideration of appropriate responses 
to corruption will arise strategies for its investigation and control. 
What determines that the impact and perception of corruption will be unique is 
what I will describe as "making monsters". Quite simply this refers to the interpretation 
and translation of certain advantage centred relationships into a focus for community 
apprehension and concern. The omnipresent threat represented by public corruption needs 
to be understood not only in terms of its social reality, but also through the political 
processes which manage it. 
Paper delivered at a public seminar entitled "ICAC: Lessons From the First Twelve Months", convened by 
the Institute of Criminology at Sydney University Law School, 29 August 1990. 
2 See Bodde, D. and Morris, C., Law in Imperial China (1967) pp 423-424. 
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Finally, the orchestration of community expectations about corruption and its 
control, as well as the institutional satisfaction of these, merit examination in order that the 
definition, sanction, representation, and reaction issues might be viewed in a community 
context 
Throughout this paper I will draw on experiences from several different commun-
ity settings. This should not be viewed as any attempt at cross cultural analysis. I have 
emphasised previously for example, that "the acceptability appropriateness and potency of 
any institutional response to corruption depends on a recognition that such a response will 
be bound to reflect the community out of which it emerged".3 While some general 
motivations behind monster making and corruption are universal, one needs to be cautious 
in drawing general conclusions about even the public perception of corruption4 from the 
experience of individual cultures and communities. 
CRIMINALISING CORRUPTION 
The relationship between individualised criminal liability, and incidents of corruption is 
often taken as given. Manifestations of corruption are seen in terms of behaviour which 
might otherwise stand as elements of a criminal offence. This is not to say that corruption 
is synonymous with criminality, but rather that they are represented as being inextricably 
linked. And the pre-conditions for state initiated responses flow from this. The 
consequences of such an association are obviously those attendant on the process of 
criminalisation more generally. 5 Corruption is at the same time criminal, more than crime, 
and major crime. It is unique, meriting purpose designed investigation and control options, 
but its perpetrators are no more than criminals and should be treated as such. 
In his second reading address on the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
Bill, the Premier of New South Wales echoed such a contrary position on the nature of 
corruption; " ... corruption is by its nature secretive and difficult to elicit It is a crime of 
the powerful. It is a consensual crime, with no obvious victim willing to complain".6 
A somewhat free ranging approach to the conceptualisation of corruption as a 
crime is clearly facilitated by the reluctance of law makers to profer tight definitions of 
what is corruption. They prefer instead to put forward behaviour or offence typologies 
which will constitute corruption in certain circumstances, rather than have a crack at a 
comprehensive delineation. In Hong Kong for example, the principal statutory weapon of 
3 Findlay, M., "Institutional Responses to Corruption: Some Critical Reflections on the ICAC'' (1988) 
12 Criminal lAw Journal 271. 
4 See Grabosky, P., "Citizen Co-Production and Corruption Control: Community Ideas and Roles in 
Combatting Corruption", paper presented to the Fourth International Anti-Corruption Conference, Sydney, 
1989. 
5 See Findlay, M., "Organised Resistance, Terrorism and Criminality in Ireland: The State's Construction of 
the Control Equation" (1984) 21-22 Crime and Social Justice 95-115; Ditton, J., Controlology: Beyond the 
New Criminology (1967). 
6 New South Wales Legislative Assembly, Hansard 26 May 1988 p 678. 
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"corruption busters" is the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. No where in this instrument is 
there any direct reference to corruption however, although it does detail a wide range of 
practices which may constitute an "advantage".7 
The legislation which established an ICAC in New South Wales takes a very 
broad sweep at the meaning of corruption. Section 8 talks of "adverse effects on the honest 
and impartial exercise of official functions", "the dishonest or partial exercise of any . . . 
official functions", "breaches of public trust" and the "misuse of information or material 
. . . acquired in the course of an official function". These are further reduced down to 
offence designations such as bribery, obtaining or offering secret commissions or 
perverting the course of justice. While corrupt conduct may be constituted by any of the 
twenty-five offence typologies listed in s8(2), s9 indicates that the statute's concept of 
corruption is not fundamentally tied to the criminality of the behaviour in question and 
may be satisfied by what might otherwise by considered a disciplinary offence. 
The use of such a grab-bag of offences, and the partial identification of corruption 
in a generic sense, will obviously allow the anti-corruption agencies considerable leeway 
in their efforts to criminalise the corrupt. One definitional theme which is consistant in 
various representations, is that corruption relates to the criminal abuse of public trust, for 
gain. 
It is essential for the monster making process that the social reality of corruption 
remain unspecified. It is also useful that reactions to the criminalisation of corruption. 
particularly the application of legal sanctions, should range from virtual scapegoating, to 
what Morris and Hawkins refer to as "overreach".8 This will mean that in future, when it 
comes to political answers, almost anything goes. 
THE AVOIDANCE OF THEORY 
What enables this open-ended approach to corruption, so susceptable to, and ripe for 
political manouvring, to develop? A review of the critical analysis of public sector corrupt-
ion (sparse as it is) reveals one telling explanation: the absence of any theoretical 
explanation of the dynamics of corruption. In stark contrast to this is the useful paper by 
Benson and Baden, "The Political Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of 
Underground Govemment".9 Essentially, they try to locate public sector corruption within 
the consequences of certain government strategies. Their arguments are a refinement of 
opportunity theory, which has a keen relevence for instances of corruption. Bersten and 
Hogg highlight dangers of ignoring opportunity when attempting to control corruption: 
There are many factors which influence the incidence and patterns of criminal activity 
beyond the predispositions of individuals. One is simply the opportunity structure that 
exists in relation to particular criminal activities. The point is of particular relevance in 
7 See Findlay, op cit supra n 3 at 273. 
8 Morris, N. and Hawkins, G., The HoMst Politician's Guide to Crime Control (1969) Chapter 1. 
9 Benson, B. and Baden, J., "The Politi.cal Economy of Governmental Corruption: The Logic of 
Underground Government" (1985) 14Journal of Legal Studies 391-410. 
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relation to public corruption, for opportunities and temptations are shaped in crucial 
respects by the nature of the public office in question and specific organisational 
structures, modes of supervision, etc, attending it. The types of institutional conditions 
which provide opportunities and temptations to dishonest and corrupt practices and 
which might be the focus of inquiry and reform include the following: areas of low 
visibility decision making and unsupervised discretion; areas of decision making 
involving sizeable monetary transactions; public agencies and decision making entailing 
substancial interference into potentially lucrative private activities . . . or the 
regulation/licensing of lucrative private activities.10 
Benson and Baden see the public official's control over private rights and 
benefits, which is endemic throughout developing bureaucracies, as the source of 
opportunity for both legitimate and illegitimate transaction. Opportunities for corrupt 
transactions are translated into reality due to certain incentives, via the exercise of discret-
ion on the part of the corruptor and the corruptee. The simple identification of opportunity, 
it is their view, is only the first step in understanding the dynamics of corruption. Further it 
is essential to examine the relative strengths of incentives to participate in corrupt 
activities. Unfortunately the interrelationship between opportunity and incentive is not 
fully deconstructed before they embark on this second stage. But they do set the scene 
through an imaginative analogy with government, based on an analysis of property rights 
and market forces. They observe at the outset that governments operate by "assigning, 
reassigning, modifying, or attenuating property rights". 11 Regulation, which is essential 
for the creation of opportunity and incentive, can be described from a property rights 
perspective. Without this, I would suggest, the development of incentive, and its possible 
control, will be passed over in the more pressing rush to organise unique anti-corruption 
strategies which are incorrectly focussed on individuals or typologies. 
Individuals and groups have strong incentives to influence the definition of property 
rights ... First they can accept the given structure of rights as defined by the public 
sector and thereafter acquire and dispose of resources through voluntary transfers under 
a rule of willing consent ... Second, investments can be made in lobbying in an effort to 
influence government to alter the rights assignment throu~h its regulatory or taxing 
powers. A third but more risky alternative is to resort to theft. 2 
Having set the parameters for their conceptualisation of incentive, they develop the market 
perspective, as it operates underground. Such illegal underground markets arise when the 
institutional structure precludes private owners from allocating their resources in a 
competitive or unregulated market. With such regulation comes descretion and the 
opportunity for corruption. 
In his work on economic models for crime and punishment, Gary Becker tried to 
demonstrate that individuals are more likely to commit a crime (participate in an 
underground market) when the potential payoff from the illegal act is high relative to the 
individual's other opportunities, when the probability of being caught is relatively low, or 
10 Bersten, M. and Hogg, R., "NSW Anti-Corruption Commission: Has it Been Worth the Wait?" (1988) 
13/4 Legal Service Bulletin 146-149 at 147. 
11 Benson and Baden, op cit supra n 9 at 392. 
12 Ibid at 392-393. 
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when the potential punishment is relatively light.13 The market operates therefore from a 
perceived need of a service, an institutionalised inequity in its legitimate allocation, and 
the ability to neutralise the possible effects of a corrupt resolution. 
Focussing on the generation of opportunity, Bensen and Baden state that 
corruption is a consequence of discretionary political authority. The background 
conditions for the corrupt exercise of that discretion are the restrictions which create the 
illegal market. It might not only be the transaction of property rights in a monopolistic 
market which is the incentive for corruption, but also the guarantee of those rights 
allocations against third parties. 
Exploiting a monopoly position requires entry restrictions, typically arising from 
governmental policy. In the case of underground markets, all entry is illegal; but if 
enforcement is easy, corrupt public officials can sell the right to produce to selected 
illegal firms. In this instance an underground market for governmentally controlled 
property rights may be required for a private sector underground market to operate . . . 
The rights are valuable (that someone is willing to pay for the exclusive right implies 
that the expected returns must be at least high enough to cover the bribe and compensate 
the buyer for the risk incured), and governmental officials have power to allocate them. 
Opportunities for underground transactions involving purchases of those rights from 
government officials are a consequence.14 
Once opportunity, then incentive. The exercise of the official's discretion, if 
rational, is based on infonnation and incentives. These incentives are delineated usefully 
in economic terms, as did Becker. 
MAKING MONSTERS 
It is usually those institutions which are eminently corruptable which construct corruption 
priorities. Remaining with the exercise of public discretions, it is goverments, and their 
political wings, which take the moral highground on corruption. Why? Passing over the 
obvious reasons of self interest and smokescreening, there are market based imperatives as 
to why a government needs to establish that it is neither institutionally corrupt, nor 
individually corruptable. 
1) In order to exist as a legitimate regulator of property relations, a government must 
seek compliance in the market place. Such compliance is achieved through policies 
which range across a continuum from consensus to force based. Certain ideologies 
of government require operation towards the consensus based end of the policy 
range. Apparent levels of corruption within government militate against the 
generation of consensus based compliance. 
2) The maintainance of respect for government regulations which limit competition 
within the market relies on the understanding that the authorised management 
within government has the monopoly over the creation of such regulations. 
13 Becker, G., "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76 Journal of Political 
Economy 169. 
14 Benson and Baden, op cit supra n 9 at 396. 
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3) Government functionaries to whom power is delegated for the negotiation and 
enforcement of these regulations must operate within, and be normally accountable 
to the authorised management of government. 
If corruption and corruptability enter the market play then the position of 
government as a monopolistic regulator is weakened. The legitimate procedures for 
influencing the transaction of government regulations become viewed as negotiable. 
There is considerable evidence which reveals that in practice corruption is 
difficult to control or eradicate. This is more so when the market accepts its existance, or 
even prefers it to an environment of "good government". Rarely will it be considered 
possible for a government to admit that by regulating the market, and orchestrating 
property relations, it also creates opportunities for corruption. Nor is it conveniently 
communicable to expose the complex forces which act as incentives to corruption, many 
of which may also show up flaws in the management of government itself. This is where 
"monstering" comes in. 
Corruption can be "monstered" in a variety of ways: 
i) Through the selective exposure of instances of corruption in sensitive areas of 
government. The danger of this is that the government may not be able to control 
the process of exposure or its consequences (for example, the initial focus on police 
corruption following the establishment of the ICAC in Hong Kong). 
ii) By the individualisation of corruption through scapegoating. This may have adverse 
consequences for the morale of players in the market, or will undermine confidence 
in the market itself (for example, the initial effect on confidence in Queensland 
following the revelations of the Fitzgerald inquiry, concerning the personalities of 
political corruption in that State). 
iii) Through "what if" scaremongering; highlighting particular susceptability of certain 
areas of government and the serious effect of their corruption. The risk here is the 
revelation that anti-corruption initiatives may be ineffective (for example, the 
recurrent speculation about the corrupt processing of property development at local 
government level). 
iv) The moral vigilance position; no admissions of the existance of corruption, but 
through analogy, emphasising the need to remain pure. This may open the 
government up to accusation of unreality or "cover-up" (for example, the position 
adopted by specialist units in the police force with regards to other units, or other 
forces). 
Whatever method is adopted, the purpose is similar. By objectifying and 
externalising corruption it becomes a less problematic and more universally accepted 
object for government action. The government can reassert its market dominance by 
broadcasting a monopoly over corruption control. This is not to suggest that government 
anti-corruption initiatives will not work through a compliant media, a sensitised corporate 
sector, and an implicated community. Rather it means the state would have it that through 
the control of corruption control it should still be viewed as dominant over any 
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underground market regulation. This predominance has importance not only for 
consructing corruption priorities, but is vital for stylising anti-corruption strategies. And 
both these will be fundamentally constrained by prevailing ideologies of government. This 
would explain, for example, the commitment to formal hearings as an investigative tech-
nique of the ICAC in New South Wales, which is viewed as anachronistic by their 
counterparts in Hong Kong. 
The implication which arises out of claims to regulate and control corruption, is 
that the government not only understands the problem, but eventually will have power 
over it. The path to power is delineated by the ways in which the threat posed by corrupt-
ion is represented, and by the discourse and institutions of control. 
It makes functional sense from the goverment's perspective not to expose the 
reality of corruption in a macro sense. Real debates about the nature and extent of 
corruption and its possible eradication may only lead to a greater diminution of the 
government's position, if it becomes apparent that its potency in this regard is limited. The 
tactical alternative is to develop the monster into a myriad of manageable images, and to 
create "independent" agencies, which are finally beholden to government, for the apparent 
purpose of control. In the short term, the battle has more significance than the result. If 
control in any sense proves illusive then the government only need alter the anti-corruption 
priorities. 
DELIMITING THE RANGE 
Part of the effort towards image creation on the government's behalf, is to constrain the 
perceptions of corruption, as well as the operations of the control agency. This is as much 
to ensure the presentation of a manageable political discourse about corruption, as it is to 
conceal its endemic institutional and operational origins and incentives. Making monsters 
is one thing, but they must be manageable. As recent enquiries into public corruption have 
revealed, this is not always so. 
One popular limiting technique is to float the public, private division. In New 
South Wales, for instance, the legislation which established an Independent Commission 
Against Corruption, has limited its investigative interest to instances of public corruption, 
and to prevent breaches of public trust. In this respect it is necessary that the corruption 
transaction must involve a public official, organisation or duty. 
If we return to our market analogy we will appreciate the non-existance of such a 
division outside political rhetoric. The necessary interrelationship between government 
and commerce in most financial operations is indivisible. To endeavour to see the 
opportunities and incentives for corruption simply in public sector terms is to miss the 
transactional nature of corruption. If the recipient of the bribe is a public official, where 
does the money so often come from? 
If this division is so easily falsified then why is it relied upon as a limit? The 
answer lies in a subsidiary level of purpose for monstering. The language of corruption 
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discourse needs to be kept uncomplicated for government purposes, if it is to have an in-
fluence on community perceptions. Simple distinctions which allow for a unidimensional 
focus on the problem, sit well within such language. 
Further, such a division is either misconceived or deceptive. Whether the mystif-
ication and obfuscation which results from reference to it is deliberate or otherwise, 
doesn't much matter for a consideration of effect. The real issues of corruption opportunity 
and incentive are displaced outside public expectations, which are directed away into 
unhelpful dichotomies. 
The significance of the public/private designation is further transferred into 
operational strategies. In the case of the New South Wales ICAC, the commitment to 
public hearings as an investigative tool can not be grounded in parallels with "open 
government" alone. As the Hong Kong position argues, it certainly will not find support in 
models of effective policing practice. The overriding expectation for open hearings is that 
they should stand in stark public contrast with the private exercise of discretion by public 
authorities, which is the focus of their inquiries. 
But the dangers inherent in the Royal Commission format have not been lost on 
the recent legislators. As the Australian High Court decisions of Balog, and Stait v ICAC 
conclude, the legislature in New South Wales, both directly and indirectly limited what 
appropriately could be drawn by the Commission from its findings: 
Since the broad fimction of the Commission under section 13(1)(c) [of the ICAC Act] is 
to commmtlcate the results of its investigations concerning corrupt conduct to approp-
riate authorities, it is apparent that its primary role is not that of expressing, at all events 
in any formal way, any conclusions it might reach concerning criminal liability ... the 
Commission is intended to be primarily an investigative body whose investigations are 
intended to facilitate the actions of others in combating corrupt conduct It is not a law 
enforcement agency, and it exercises no judicial or quasi-judicial function. Its 
investigative powers carry with them no implication . . . that it should be able to make 
findings against individuals of corrupt or criminal behaviour.15 
Section 79 of the ICAC Act (NSW) limits the Commission's opportunity to report conclus-
ions of corrupt conduct to those investigations referred to it by Parliament 
The High Court appreciated the fine line in practice between making adverse 
findings, and merely reporting the results of an investigation. However, it took the view 
that it was a distinction which went beyond theory, and had practical relevance as a 
limitation on the conclusions to be drawn publicly by a commission of inquiry at a pre-trial 
stage, perhaps from evidence which might not be admissible in an eventual court 
proceeding, or elicited from a witness outside the usual due process protections. 
The Commissioner Mr Ian Temby QC was quick to attack these limitations on his 
office, and called on some appropriate legislative clarification. His earlier observations on 
the Commission's general functions do not contradict the High Court's interpretation: 
15 High Court of Australia, matter no S29 of 1990. 
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I see the primary role [of the ICAC] as being to minimise corruption by investigation 
and hearing, by corruption prevention, and by public education. All three of them are 
important in terms of the statute and in terms of our strategy. I see the seeming of 
criminal convictions as being subsidiary and incidental to those primary aims and 
methods.16 
The creation of novel anti-corruption strategies is effected in an atmosphere of 
political "give and take". The public hearing format, coupled with the powers to compel 
the presentation of evidence, create powerful control potentials over the reputations of 
suspects and witnesses. Add to this the opportunity to make adverse findings at the 
conclusion of such investigations, and the Commission can use its leverage over the public 
standing of individuals to extract more than might other traditional criminal justice 
agencies. Legislators have sought to limit these combined powers away from those 
enquiries initiated by the Commission itself, or outside the direct interests of Parliament. 
In so doing, they have not relied on the consequential oversight of the· judiciary, but they 
have benefited from recent judicial interpretations. 
ORCHESTRATION OF PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS 
The community, within and outside the market, are an important audience for monstering. 
The lessons from community directed corruption programmes like that so successfully 
permeating Hong Kongl 7 endorse this in a specific sense. Witch-hunting and media-
feeding have their place in sensitising the public to corruption as an issue of self-interest. 
However, for any long term effect on perceptions it is necessary to implicate the 
community both in the dynamics of corruption, and responsibility for its control. 
Receptive public expectations are vital for any politically centred initiatives. 
Corruption control is no different The methods used will be culturally and community 
specific, and may be bound up in the monstering exercise. After all, fundamental issues of 
government legitimacy are measured in a community context, and I have endeavoured to 
represent corruption control (in a market sense at least), as just one of these. 
In functional terms, public expectations have significance for the success potential 
of any control strategy. They will also promote or retard the self-perpetuation of any 
anti-corruption push. 
Public expectations are often constructed in an atmosphere of necessity. For 
example, once the monster image of corruption is constructed, the community is told that 
there is no alternative but that which is on the government's agenda, for its control. All 
other options are inadequate. The power of this argument rests in the generalised repres-
entation of a unique threat: 
The classic form of corruption involves the giving and taking of a bribe, and there is 
strong tendency for neither side of the transaction to report it. When bribes are paid the 
16 Committeon theICAC, 1990p 18. 
17 Findlay, M., "ICAC and the Commwrity" (1990) Vol2No1 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 119-126. 
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debilitating effect upon the function of society - and particularly the public sector, if 
public officials are involved - is very great. The real question is, as I would urge, 
whether something should be done about it. It cannot be done by traditional 
investigative methods, and through the criminal justice system. You cannot get results 
except by setting up a specialist body and giving it specialist powers. Hence the JCAC 
Act ... If you want to tackle corruption you have to do it through something like this 
way. You cannot do it through the criminal justice system because that is a proven 
failure. You cannot use traditional methods of investigation and prosecution and results. 
It has been tried and it just does not work.18 
Failure theory is resorted to here with respect to traditional law enforcement options in a 
non-problematic and imperative tone. The justification for the new strategy rests in 
condemning the old. The dangers involved in this mode of expectation creation are 
obvious. 
It IS mteresting to see where the Commissioner takes the progress of his 
justification, from establishing the relationship between the unique threat and the specialist 
response. He then presents a measure of success which might equally well be interpreted 
in terms of failure theory: 
If the Act were repealed then a judgment is made that the job has been substantially 
done and levels of corruption are down to a point which does not demand a specialist 
agency.19 
Mr Temby invoked the wisdom of the legislature, and in so doing was sheeting 
home ultimate responsibility for success or failure in meeting anti-corruption expectations, 
back to its political base: 
The alternative that Parliament has opted for is to say 'We will set up a specialist body. 
It will have investigative powers and co-ercive powers and an obligation to report to 
Parliament' ... If Parliament has made the wrong judgment, the remedy lies in 
Parliament's hands. But I say that it is not possible to go back to what some see as being 
'the good old days' if you want to tackle the corruption problem.20 
Finally, the community is implicated in the control process, in a personal way. It's your 
problem and you must want to tackle it! 
CORRUPTION BUSTING 
The creation by a government, of the next strategy for dealing with corruption will so often 
be based on what Stan Cohen (1985) refers to as "failure theory". Simply speaking, this is 
the notion that because all previous approaches seem to have been unsuccessful in any 
nominated sense, this is justification enough for launching new enforcement initiatives 
which may outstrip the powers and potential of any agency which may have gone before. 
The political significance of such institutional development is the appearance that with the 
18 Commissioner Temby giving evidence before the Conunittee on the ICAC, 1990 p 30. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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creation of "new" organisational options arises evidence of the government's eventual 
control monopoly. 
It is usually the case that state based responses to corruption utilise elements of 
the criminal justice process. It is not so however that these are always constructed within 
the traditional constraints of criminal justice administration, nor do they work exclusively 
towards the utilisation of the criminal sanction. For example, the ICAC in Hong Kong is 
invested, under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (Part III), with powers of 
investigation which would make police officers green with envy. The ICAC in New South 
Wales, through its public hearing format, concentrates on the accumulation of evidence 
which, in many instances may not be admissable in later criminal proceedings. Both 
agencies rely on their influence over the reputation and public standing of a suspect, as 
much as they might the threat of resultant criminal convictions. 
Modem corruption control agencies seem willing to enlist the assistance of forces 
outside the normal institutions of criminal justice. This sometimes leads to alienation from 
traditional police agencies, in particular. The manipulation of media comment through 
public hearings, and the policy of selective secrecy when it comes to the disemination of 
their investigative intelligence, are powerful weapons which might not sit well with 
traditional policing practice. 
As regards investigation practice, the adaptations which have arisen to cope 
generally with corporate deviance in a market situation find commonality with modem 
coruption control practice. For example, the Hong Kong and New South Wales ICACs 
assist in the establishment of internal audit regimes within organisations, for the purpose of 
identifying potential and extant corruption. Not only the nature of the corporate entity, but 
the complexity of the deviance which is generated within it has led to a rethink of control 
strategies, and the appropriateness of the individualised criminal sanction for situations of 
collective liability.21 
In the area of state centred corruption, control agencies can anticipate a positive 
relationship between the growth of government, and the opportunities for corruption. With 
more government controls over property relations, there will arise a greater potential for 
the sale of privileges over resultant property rights. 
Incentives for participation in private sector undergrmmd markets increase, so officials 
have opportunities to accept bribes in return for altering rights structures or for allowing 
some individuals or groups to operate in a private legal market without fear of 
punishment.22 
With the associated increase in incentives to become corrupt, control agencies are faced 
with the challenge of counterbalancing such an incentive shift 
21 See Braithwaite, J., "Self-Regulation: Internal Compliance Strategies to Prevent Crime by Public 
Organisations", in Grobosky, P., ed, Government Illegality (1986). 
22 Benson and Baden, op cit supra n 9 at 407. 
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A common governmental approach to this challenge is to inject resources into the 
monitoring of corruption. If the potency of monitoring, and the nature of corruption were 
to remain fairly constant, then control will be maintained by increasing such resources 
proportional to the increase in government. But beyond the simplistic level of policy 
planning, things are not so straightforward. 
Along with monitoring, goes the commitment to detection. The risk of detection is 
also sometimes seen as being concurrent with the risk of receiving bribes. State agencies 
endeavour to increase the later by making real the fonner. Yet this rests on classical 
notions of self-determination. These are easily denied by social determinants towards 
corruption which may make the sensitivity to risk rather less elastic. 
Perhaps a more effective approach to corruption control is to look at market forces 
outside individual interest. Simply because governmental discretion increases should not 
ensure that rights allocation powers must not also become more widely dispersed. 
Co-ordinated or monopoly corruption is rendered less likely through a policy of 
diversifying discretion. 
MONSTER BUSTING 
We empathise with the lone knight riding out against the dragon. No matter how futile the 
odds, his quest is seen as both a noble and satisfactory response to a universalised and 
unpredictable danger. It is almost heresy to question the existence of the fire-breathing 
monster. The odessey is all the reality which is needed. 
Perhaps the actuality of the monster is not so important. The cyclops, the 
minotaur, the dragon; as representations of impending evil they bring about a predictable 
response. In order to invest any such response with a success potential worthy of the effort, 
we must examine what's behind the monstering. 
It is not a difficult task to debunk monsters. Even journalists can perform the 
magic. One merely needs to reveal the absence of its reflection in the analyst's mirror, and 
it will vanish. But not so the impetus behind its original creation, or the swift construction 
of another to take its place. This is why to search out and destroy each new dragon, even if 
consistantly possible, is a rather futile endeavour. One Watergate expose did not make 
impossible the Iran contra scandal. 
In order that anti-corruption initiatives are potent for the task it is essential to 
address those sensitive and sometimes embarrassing institutional questions which relate to 
incentive and opportunity. 
In the specific context of police corruption I have asserted that "To some extent it 
matters little what the motivations for corrupt policing practice might be".23 To expose 
23 Findlay, M., "Acting on Information Received: Mythmaking and Police Corruption" (1987) 1 Journal of 
Studies in Justice 19 at 30. 
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such behaviour for what it is, that is true. However it does not follow the development and 
implementation of control strategies. 24 
Manning and Redlinger show just how important is a consideration of why police 
cross the invitational edges of corruption: 
The organisational ambience of narcotics law enforcement is such that rather than 
providing inducement to conformity to the law, it is more likely to underscore the 
virtues of avoidance of the more obvious requirements of law enforcement. It 
encourages rather more excess in pursuit of the job and modification of procedural rules 
to maximise arrests and buys. In the course of so doing, one learns to view with only 
minimal concern somewhat less obvious consequences of the systematic destruction of 
. . 25 Justice. 
The dynamics of corruption invite an appreciation in terms of opportunity and 
incentive, from both sides of the bargain. Effective control strategies need to develop 
through an examination of; 
i) the situational pressures presented from within the enterprises and property 
relations which the public official is charged with regulating, and 
ii) the individual, organisational, and operational priorities of the bureaucratic 
framework within which the official exercises his discretion. 
24 See Braithwaite, op cit supra n 21. 
25 Manning, P.K. and Redlinger, Ll., "Invitational Edges of Corruption: Some Consequences of Narcotics 
Law Enforcement", in Rock, P., ed, Drugs and Politics (1977) p 290. 
